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Усі публікації користувача banker

  1. имхо, оба говорите об одном и том же. просто нонстоп грит о стратегах, которые смотрят на фундаментальные вещи, а ксанеп о именно спекулянтах - давайте называть такими, тех кто входит в позицию (как шорт так и лонг) из расчета что выйдя из нее заработает прибыль. так вот именно движение с марта по всем типам активов и объясняется не тем что фундаментально все ждут роста 50% , а тем "что делать с кучей денег, которые просто сбрасывают с вертолета" - я уже писал об этом - buy now, ask later. кста, выложил в соседней ветке очень содержательную статейку, объясняющую сей феномен.
  2. рекомендую, простым английския языком о происходящих процессах: Professor Ben Bernanke of Princeton wrote a treatise on the Great Depression. After studying the Great Depression at length, the good Professor believed that he knew why the Depression occurred, and he knew what the Fed had done wrong to bring on the Great Depression. All that was needed, concluded the Professor, was the production of a veritable ocean of Fed-created money, and the Great Depression would not have happened. It was all so simple -- all so obvious. Let's move forward many years, and lo and behold, the studious Professor has been given the honor of being the new Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Bernanke took over from the man who has been called "the greatest central banker in history," none other than "bubble-maker" Alan Greenspan. Bernanke took over, the housing bubble had burst, and a surprised Ben Bernanke was given a chance to work his magic. Deflationary forces were overwhelming the world. Simple, Bernanke would apply what he had learned from his Depression studies -- he'd halt the deflation with money-creation. How much money? "Whatever it takes." The Fed created the money -- with the euphemistic "quantitative easing," better know as creating trillions of dollars. Furthermore, the Fed dropped short interest rates to the zero level. The dollar quickly took over from the Japanese yen as the carry-trade favorite. The US dollar became the planet's new "junk money." For those unfamiliar with the carry trade, people with access to world currencies find the country with the lowest interest rates (the "free money") and borrow that money. With that money, they buy high-yielding paper or even bonds and pocket the difference. What happens next is that the cheap dollar is dumped on the market in huge quantities. When any currency or any item is created in massive quantities, that item must fall in value. And the dollar is falling. Ah, Professor Bernanke, what do you do now? To make a currency more attractive, you raise the rates that it pays. But raise the Fed Funds and you squeeze that already gasping US economy. Also, when you raise rates you raise the cost of carrying the gigantic US debt. Total public and private debt in the US is around $57 trillion. A one percent rise in interest rates would drain $500 billion each year out of the US economy. Meanwhile, all the spending by the Government, the trillions that the Fed has created, seems to have gone to Wall Street. Most of the Fed-created trillions went to bail out and save the giant institutions that were considered "too big to fail." The Fed and Wall Street take care of their own. The men and women in the streets, America's consumers, are struggling with unemployment, taxes, battered stock portfolios, foreclosures, and the rising cost-of-living. Their consumption represents two-thirds of the GDP of the nation. Where was the hoped-for return that Bernanke was dreaming about? Where was the lift he was waiting for? Easy, consumers needed "boosts." Give em "Cash for Clunkers," give them tax breaks for buying houses, give them anything they need that will inspire them to spend. But what about saving? Sure, the man in the street is trying to save. But with interest rates literally at zero, what does he do with his savings? Ah, problems, problems, and as the new Fed chief wakes up at midnight from a feverish sleep, Ben Bernanke asks himself, "Why did I take this damn job? I should have stayed happily at Princeton." Back in the 1930s there were no doubts about the much-loved "Yankee dollar." The dollar was "as good as gold." And there were no damn foreign "vigilantes" to warn and pressure the US about spending. Ben never thought about that when he wrote his treatise on the Great Depression. Meanwhile, unintended consequences are emerging from the massive sums that the Bernanke Fed has created. The stock market is rising in a liquidity bubble. Worse, gold is climbing into all-time high territory, and in so doing, it is advertising to the world that the dollar is sinking and that "something is dreadfully wrong." And the worst of it is that housing prices are not rising, they remain weak. And now commercial real estate is sinking. Currently, the talk is of "exit strategies." Strategies to undo the damage that the Fed has done. But the Fed isn't finished yet. And the story hasn't been told in full. What happens if a fed-up world decides to exit the dollar? Oil is priced and sold in dollars. What if the oil producers decide that they want a different currency. What happens then? The questions are endless. The problem -- you can't save the real world with fantasy money. When too much fantasy money is created, knowledgeable people turn to real money -- gold. Which is why central bankers fear and hate gold. When the world turns to gold, it is turning away from the fantasy ("counterfeit") currency that the central banks create. This terrifies the bankers, whose power comes from their ability to create "money" out of thin air. Meanwhile, a great bull market starts, it's a bull market that mirrors the demise of the dollar. Gold is priced in dollars, and as the dollar weakens, it takes an increasing amount of fiat dollars to buy an ounce of gold. Beginning in 1999 gold started up in a primary bull market. In my personal opinion, this is fated to be one of the greatest bull markets in history. It will be a bull market built on not one, but two powerful human emotions -- both greed and fear. The speculative third phase lies ahead. Slowly but surely, the public will finally realize that the US government is bankrupt both morally and monetarily. People will panic into gold to save what ever they have left from the inflationary intentions of the US government. Aside from the Chinese and Indians, the world's population owns no gold. As the planet realizes to its horror that all fiat currency is "worthless" fantasy paper, I believe that there will be a world panic to buy gold. This will set off one of the wildest and most explosive bull markets in human history. Gold today, around $1,000 an ounce is still cheap, Cheap, CHEAP. The day is not too far in the future, when the dollar price of one ounce of gold and the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be the same number. Meanwhile, the "secondary" monetary metal is silver (often called "the poor man's gold") is far too cheap compared with its historic ratio to gold, which has been as low at 15 to 1. An ounce of gold now buys 59 ounces of silver. The following is an interesting article: With continuing stress in western economies, particularly in the U.S, changing attitudes towards gold from Central Banks, the desire to diversify reserve holdings by some major economies and the growth in ETFs, the outlook for the gold price is strong. by Lawrence Williams Monday, October 5, 2009 LONDON - U.S. gold economist, Jeffrey Nichols, seems more bullish than ever on the prospects for substantial upwards movement in the price of gold over the next few years considering the latest development in the markets, perhaps even more so than in his previous analyses. While Nichols has tended to be a gold bull in the past he has also been one of the more sober commentators amongst this genre so his developing views do require some attention. He feels the root causes of the current economic crisis - and his now extremely bullish views on gold - have been decades of easy money, low interest rates, and a persistently expansionary monetary and fiscal policy by the United States. As he put it in a speech to the Latin Exploration 2009 Conference in Buenos Aires last week, "As a result, Americans have been on a buying binge in the global marketplace, buying things we often don't really need with money we don't really have. And the rest of the world - especially China and the other Asian economic powerhouses - have been co-conspirators, lending us the money to satisfy our need for more things in order to promote economic growth and high employment in their own economies." He likens the situation to a massive Ponzi scheme on a scale never before seen. "Beginning late in President Reagan's second term with the appointment of Alan Greenspan as Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve and continuing with Ben Bernanke at the helm of America's central bank, the Fed has pursued an expansionary, low interest-rate policy that has placed growth above all else" reckons Nichols. "During these years, every economic or financial-market crisis was met with injections of liquidity into the banks and financial markets with interest rate cuts often to negative inflation-adjusted rates of return. "The stock market crash of 1987, the Gulf War beginning in 1990, the Mexican Peso Crisis in 1994, the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997, the Long-Term Capital Management bankruptcy in 1998, the Internet Dot-Com Bubble in 2000, and the U.S. Housing Bubble that ended in 2007: "Each crisis was met with more money and lower interest rates - a policy that came to be known as the Greenspan Put and more recently the Bernanke Put because it assured many of the most reckless risk-takers they would not lose a red cent. "We never would have had the last stock market boom carry valuations to such heights without easy money. We never would have had the U.S. housing boom without artificially low interest rates and without Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac promoting home ownership for everyone, whether or not they could really afford it. "We never would have had the mortgage-backed securities debacle without easy money and low interest rates. And, no one - especially foreign central banks - would have bought these and other sub-prime securities if they thought they could lose their shirts. "Rather than allowing periodic recessions and bear markets to purge the excesses of each prior boom or bubble, the Fed stimulated the economy with massive doses of new credit, more injections of liquidity, and lower interest rates. Neither the Fed nor the politicians in Washington wanted a recession - and hardly anyone complained when the Fed just printed more money." says Nichols. Like all ‘Ponzi Schemes', investors lose out at the end, although those in and out again in the early stages can make massive gains. As to the current ‘economic recovery', Nichols, like a number of other economic observers is skeptical to say the least. "Although many are beginning to talk about economic recovery in the United States, those that are seeing "green shoots" are looking through "rose-colored" eyeglasses" says Nichols " . . . and there is significant risk of a "double-dip recession with further contraction and a second down-leg yet to come. The economy is showing signs of life only because of massive injections of liquidity by the Fed and the various bailouts by the Treasury." "We have never" says Nichols "in the economic history of the United States seen a period of rapid growth in money and credit nor an extended period of negative real interest rates that has not been followed by a declining dollar exchange rate and a rising inflation rate at home." Nichols also notes as bullish for the gold price a changing attitude towards gold by Central Banks, with even those which have been among the sellers now seemingly reluctant to sell any more, while countries like China and Russia are now increasing their portions of reserves held in gold - and still have a huge way to go to get anywhere near the percentages held by most western Central Banks. Indeed those Central Banks which did sell large percentages of their gold holdings are looking pretty foolish - perhaps most of all the U.K. which sold half its reserves under the guidance of current Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (who has since managed to spin his way to a reputation for financial prudence), at the nadir of the price - now known by U.K. economists as ‘Browns Bottom'. There certainly seems to be a trend towards increased diversification of reserve assets away from what is seen as a dollar in decline, with gold probably being a major beneficiary. The performance of the scrap market in this latest run-up to $1,000 is also cause for positive thinking among the bulls with the responsiveness of the scrap market being much more subdued than the last time gold moved above this level. Gold mine production is also seen as continuing to decline having seemingly peaked and with the main areas of production growth in countries like China and Russia which may well be buying up all their domestic production anyway, new supply to the market may be limited. Another factor noted by Nichols is the introduction and growing popularity of gold exchange-traded funds which have changed the market in a very important way that is not yet well appreciated by many analysts and observers of the gold scene. By facilitating gold investment and ownership ETFs have brought significant numbers of new participants to the market - not just individuals but hedge funds, pensions, and other institutional investors. Nichols concludes that thanks to extremely expansionary monetary policy - and with a little help from ETF investors, central banks, and new or evolving markets - like China and India – the gold price will continue to move ahead. He reckons $2,000 to $3,000 is on the cards in the next few years.
  3. можно на пальцах/примерах объяснить о схлопывании? если считать что бюджетники через казначейство обслуживаются? а банки кредитов новых не дают, но платежи справно проводят? или есть факты задержек?
  4. поставил спасибо за то что интересный подсчет указан был, а также фактаж по фрг и гдр... ясно что украина не финляндия и не германия, но если применить принцип расчета затрат на преодоление отсалости, то и получится что долга на каждого украинца, который набрал ипотеки, авто и прочих кредитов еще сильно не хватает, и того долга который набрала держава, включая все квазисуверены пока еще тоже... так что, может права Юля Владимировна , когда грит что нам еще брать и брать кредитов...
  5. зрите в корень: весной 08 еще все на всех имели лимиты, выдавали кредиты, значит искали привлечения на мбк. ныне все жмут балансы, сидят в кэше, лимиты друг на друга закрыли, или оставили макс овернайт-1неделя. покупают нбу серты, либо овгз. вот и все объяснение. а субъектам хозяйстваования по прежнему нужно платить налоги, зп, комунальные, закупки...вот и остается - это продавать выручку валютную, так как перекредитоваться тупо негде.
  6. им нужно было погасить 1,1 а собрали 1,3, так что похоже. в 20ч нужно погасить 1,4 а скока соберут? и по какой цене? не учел я фактора твердого противостояния между юями... в этот раз цб должен ставить бид, валиться ниже 8 динамика ПБ не позволяет...
  7. вчера минфин привлек 1,2 млрд грн у банков на 6 месяцев под 25% годовых. если страна берет по таким ценам, почвем должны быть кредиты в гривне заемщикам? з.ы. ветка превращается - все банкиры козлы, все буды из за них...либо заканчиваем тогда нах эту ветку и открывем новую, либо пишем по делу... з.з.ы даже шутка от кукушки для меня звучит оскорбительно. имхо
  8. предложите свой вариант прогноза...только просьба - типа, всем писец, кругом разруха - не писать, иначе будете просто очередным слюнобрызгом...мы ж вроде тут умничать пытаемся
  9. www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/09/23/000333038_20090923232026/Rendered/INDEX/495730REPLACEM1cord1020091020911111.txt длинно, но фундаментально. думаю что нонстоп и уманов найдут полезным
  10. но что ждет мир? www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1212013/Revealed-The-ghost-fleet-recession-anchored-just-east-Singapore.html
  11. на нача окт монетарка в пределах 180 млрд грн. по мемо с фондом таргет по потолку на конец года 210. так что +30 млрд грн в заначке есть (освоим 18млрд бондов сидящих в уставнике нафтогаза + 12млрд на рекап того же родовида который возьмет на борт 7 ярд с укрпрома, с надрой еще до конца не ясно, а там не меньше..) а что будет если они выплеснутся даже в отдельно взятом декабре?
  12. если предположиь что есть - то да, может такое и случиться. а если предположиь что нет, и цб не хочет продлевать то читаем газеты, смотрим тв и каждую неделю новые имена с врем админами...что в принципе правильно как для всей системы, так и для курса. но вот если начнут всех подряд спасать, то тогда отматывем пленку на 3 месяца назад --только дали 3 банкам рекап в июле, которые активно стали выдавать депозиты, которые тут-жу перметнулись на улицу...дальше понятно. хотя с другой стороны - если просто продлят, а новых денег не дадут, то чему давить на курс? правильно, заемщики будут гаситься и далее, а гривна куда? если продлили уже на год или 7 лет рефинанс? в новые кредиты? не уверен я однако.
  13. советую посмотреть если есть время (ссылка устарела) - другие темы тоже акутальны и хорошо объяснены
  14. да нет, напомню что в прошлом сент-окт цб начал активно выдавать рефинанс, как правило это были годовые транши. всего было выдано под 80 млрд грн. из них 35 в надежные руки, в которых продлятся еще на 7 лет. значится 45 ярдов должны возвращаться. у пиба таких на балансе 4,4 млрд грн было на 01,06,09...ему давали вспомнитте когда... все цифры взяты из публичных источников
  15. обшибся...долгов дийсно в 2 раза меньше было до кризиса, возьмите тот же скм или исд. а сейчас продажи на экспорт в деньгах снизились а олги остались на месте. продажи на внутр рынок не шибко помогают для выплаты валютных кредитов...
  16. разделяю мнение товарисча оттуда: также понравилось сравнение истории развития СССР и Китая The last two weeks have seen an outpouring of rumors from the G-20 meeting, the G-7 meeting, and the IMF-World Bank meetings, as well as various non-OECD financial sources, that plans are underway to replace the dollar as the global monetary anchor. Trial balloons have ranged from the standard SDR-type ‘multi-lateral institution’ construction to a China – oil axis splash of cold water. Clearly the natives are getting restless watching the dollar drop year after year, so the US right of seigniorage is under attack. Although there are some clear advantages to having your own currency accepted in all international transactions and to having it used in the black market or as a second currency in countries with an unacceptable currency, there are burdens as well. In the last few decades, the health of the global economy has been dependent on the monetary policy of the United States: if the Fed was tight global trade declined and world growth dropped, but if the Fed was loose the world economy boomed. Expanding dollar liquidity helped everyone, even if it was the wrong thing for the US – which many times it was. The dollar actually acts as the world’s working capital. This right of seigniorage, or acting as the currency benchmark, is an extremely important function for the health of the global financial system, and it probably cannot be changed without subjecting the world economy to great risk. The last time there was a change, from the pound Sterling to the dollar, the process took almost 20 years, a period that included the Depression and World War II. The pound slowly grew into this position, but after the First World War with international finance a shambles and London acting as the banking center, it really came into the role. Sterling transactions were dominant in international trade and finance, but as London and the pound grew in importance Great Britain’s current account deteriorated and its net international asset position declined. London bankers might have financed the world’s growth but they drained Britain’s wealth as pounds flowed into foreign hands. The same thing has happened to the United States. If we were to argue that 1918 saw the start of Sterling dominance and 1967 was the absolute end of it (as the pound suffered a devaluation then), and that the dollar began its unencumbered dominance in 1971, we could argue that the end might come in 2020, but we haven’t had the Depression or the financial dislocation of a major war yet. Of course the US is a much larger economy, so perhaps the US and its banks can take the strain for another few decades. A dominant economy is a prerequisite for being the hegemon of the currency space, so the only possible candidate is China. But at this time, China is small, relative to the US, and will not pass it in size for 20 years at the earliest, assuming no cataclysmic war or natural catastrophe hits the US. Also, China must make the many-year trek to become a financial center, as the only way a currency becomes dominant is to have banks lending it around the world and taking deposits in it as well. We have a few thousand renminbi in our office, as we can’t even get Citibank to exchange them for dollars. China has to prove it is politically stable. Although there is only an N of 1 in our example, the Soviet Union had a short life. It began in 1917, suffered the Stalinist terror and war from about its 15th year through 1945. It then freed up its system in 1956, hosted the Olympics in 1980 at the peak of its power, but collapsed about 10 years later, at the age of 72. We will put China on this schedule starting in 1949, with the Cultural Revolution starting in 1966, 17 years later, ending with Mao’s death in 1976. The opening of the economy in the early 1980’s led to fantastic growth and the Olympics in 2008. If the parallel holds up, China will suffer dramatic changes about ten years from now. Although the dollar is weak and the Asia is gaining strength, many things must happen before the dollar loses its perch.
  17. к Одессе и ее жителям отношусь очень положительно, даже с восхищением. почесному. был там 3-4 раза - влюбился сразу в город. может на пенсии перееду, поближе к жизни так сказать.
  18. зачот! вот только почему то в обиходе жлоб звучит как нечто оскорбительное. а деловарі жлобі бівают в одессе?
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